The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World

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Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah*

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Hizballah—the "Party of God"—is a movement of Shi'i Muslims who wish to restore Islam to a place of pre-eminence in the political, social, and economic order of the Muslim world. Hizballah began as a movement of social and political protest, arising out of the breakdown of the Lebanese state and the messianic expectations which the Islamic Revolution in Iran stirred among Lebanon's Shi'is. In order to survive and compete in the Lebanese arena, Hizballah established an armed militia and a covert branch. The means at its disposal have been mixed with consummate skill to advance Hizballah's declared aim of Islamic revolution.[1]

That aim has the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has made a major material, political, and emotional investment in Hizballah.[2] The role of Iranian support and guidance in Hizballah's growth is obvious, although the precise linkages still constitute secret history. That history, if it is ever written, is likely to be a bewildering one, because many Iranian agencies are at work in Hizballah: the Revolutionary Guards, the foreign ministry, the Martyrs' Foundation, the ministry of Islamic guidance, the ministry of intelligence and internal security, the personal representatives of Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri, and others. But if the details remain obscure, the general conclusion is inescapable: there is a great deal of co-ordination between Iran and Hizballah.

At any one time between 1982 and 1989, there were several hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guards (*Pasdaran*) in the Biqa Valley, where they provided regular military training to the militiamen of Hizballah. Iran co-ordinated the political activities of Hizballah through a governing Lebanon Council (*Majlis Lubnan*) which brought together the movement's men of

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thought and action, and Iranian officials also conducted formal and informal consultations with figures in Hizballah at all levels, in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. The financial and social assistance provided to Lebanese Shi'is is also a matter of public record. Iran opened pharmacies, clinics, and hospitals in parts of Lebanon, and planned to establish agricultural co-operatives and schools.[3] It is unlikely that Hizballah could have achieved its present standing without the consistent backing of Iran. According to one Shi'i cleric in Hizballah, the gains made so far by the movement would have taken fifty years to achieve had it not been for Iran's support.[4]

But there are other factions in Lebanon that enjoy the support of external states, and material and political dependence does not distinguish Hizballah from its rivals. What is striking and distinctive about Hizballah is its cultural deference to Iran's Islamic symbols, its spiritual deference to Iran's Islamic authority, and its ideological deference to Iran's Islamic vision. Members of Hizballah take much more than money and arms from Iran: they borrow the content and trappings of a new identity, and an allegiance to the Imam Khomeini and his Islamic revolution. So thoroughly have they integrated their sense of purpose with Iran's mission that they do not see themselves as a Lebanese movement at all, but as the extension of a worldwide Islamic movement under the guidance of the Imam Khomeini, for the creation of one great Islamic state. Hizballah's premise is not only Islamic but pan-Islamic.

A noted historian of Iran has defined pan-Islam as a nineteenth-century "proto-nationalism"—a form of Muslim resistance to the high imperialism of the late nineteenth century that disappeared in the twentieth, when new linguistic and territorial nationalisms staked a more compelling claim. Pan-Islam was "an important phase in preparing minds and spirits for local nationalisms," but "died as a serious political force after the Turks themselves took the step, profoundly shocking to many of their Muslim brethren, of abolishing the caliphate in 1924."[5] A noted historian of Turkey has written that "the pan-Islamic hallucination" was "in reality a drive for freedom and independence in almost every Muslim country," and "found its reward not in a unification of believers around the caliph but in Western-supported nationalist movements."[6] Nineteenth-century pan-Islam did prepare the way for parochial nationalisms, as a form of primary resistance to the encroachments of the imperial West. Yet, in Hizballah, pan-Islam has reappeared unexpectedly in a late twentieth-century guise, as a "post-nationalist" protest against the prevailing state order in the Islamic world and the values of the parochial nationalisms that supposedly displaced it. The timing of this reappearance is a challenge to the argument that the nation and the state have finally become the legitimate focus of allegiance in the Arab world, and that modern Islam has resigned itself to the inevitability of the nation-state.

Not only does Hizballah's pan-Islamic premise defy consensus. The vast sweep of Hizballah's pan-Islamic nationalism seems to defy reality, for it is out of all proportion to the resources of the movement and its patrons. The

movement thrives amidst the despair of the southern suburbs of Beirut, whose inhabitants, while battling world powers on behalf of all Islam, must also struggle for their daily bread. While professing allegiance to Khomeini, Hizballah's members are bound up in a complex web of other allegiances—to family, neighborhood, patrons, and individual men of religion—that are very much rooted in the small realities of Lebanon. Many are caught in the middle ground between the movement's pan-Islamic nationalism and the fragments of prior loyalties—Shi'i, Lebanese, and Arab—that each Hizballahi brings with him.

Yet pan-Islam has emerged as the most widely accepted theme of political discourse in Hizballah. The embrace by Hizballah's adherents of a pan-Islamic identity is one of the most radical effects of Iran's revolution in the wider Muslim world. And the hold it has acquired upon Shi'is in cosmopolitan, multi-confessional Lebanon must be counted one of the wonders of the revolution. There is no doubt that Hizballah's pan-Islamic premise is "non-conformist,"[7] and that it is not widely shared in the Arab world, even among Shi'is. But a decade ago it had few adherents, and its very appearance, first in Iran and later in Lebanon, has been a striking deviation from the path beaten by the West.

This deviation has yet to run its course. The end of the Iran-Iraq war and internal developments in Iran may undermine Iran's commitment to Hizballah and the movement's pan-Islamic premise. The evidence assembled here is specific to a phase of Hizballah's development between 1982 and 1988, coinciding with a phase of the Iranian revolution. But whatever the future holds for Hizballah, its championing of pan-Islam in the early 1980s has been an omen that collective identities in parts of the Muslim world remain volatile. The idea of a unitary Islamic state under the guidance of a divinely-inspired leader—a nineteenth-century "hallucination"—has inspired a mass movement even as the twentieth century draws to a close. Its message perhaps is that while the faith yet survives, so too must the vision of a united Islam.

This chapter does not propose to explore all the dimensions of Hizballah's intimate relationship with Iran, but to touch on the three principal realms of Hizballah's deference to Iran. The first is the symbolic realm—the external trappings of Hizballah that serve as vivid evidence for the movement's acculturation to Iranian norms. The second is the realm of authority, centered upon the domineering figure of the Imam Khomeini. The third is the realm of ideological vision, where the influence of Islamic Iran upon Hizballah finds formulation in pan-Islamic doctrine.

The methodological assumption is that the symbols, the allegiances, and ideals that serve Hizballah are a window into its world, and not some form of Shi'i or Lebanese dissimulation behind which lies a hidden agenda. Hizballah employs dissimulation in the operational sphere, in order to confuse its enemies. But when Hizballah flies the Iranian flag at a demonstration in the Biqa Valley or plasters the southern suburbs of Beirut with posters of Khomeini, it is speaking directly to its own following. While such

acts include rhetorical elements, they are not simply rhetorical devices devoid of all meaning. They may be interpreted and contextualized, but cannot be dismissed.

Points of Origin

For the sake of order, it is worth dwelling in brief upon the history of Islamic Iran's penetration of the Lebanese Shi'i community. The process is rooted in the now-vanished world of the Shi'i academies of Iraq. A generation of young scholars, educated in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala in the 1960s and 1970s, came under the powerful influence of radical theories of Islamic government and economics first formulated by Iraqi Shi'i thinkers. Najaf in particular was the site of great intellectual ferment during those two decades, a ferment fueled by the fears of the Shi'i clerics that their Islamic values and religious autonomy were threatened by westernizing influences. Their response was to elaborate a theory of an Islamic state which could offer a satisfying alternative to the rival doctrines of nationalism and communism that had made inroads even in Najaf. These clerics thought, lectured, and wrote on such subjects as Islamic government, Islamic economics, and the ideal Islamic state. Concepts of Islamic government reached their furthest refinement after the arrival in 1965 of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who spent fourteen years of exile in Najaf and there formulated his intellectual case for Islamic government. The principles of Islamic economics reached their fullest articulation at about the same time in the teachings of an Iraqi Shi'i theoretician, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.[8]

At the time of formulation, these ideas were so remote from implementation that they could only be described as theoretical. This was particularly true of the denial of western principles of nationality and the affirmation of the possibility and viability of a unitary and universal Islamic state. An aversion to Arab and Persian nationalism came readily to classrooms where Arabic- and Persian-speakers sat together in the study of sacred texts. The bonds forged in this brotherhood found a natural expression in the assumption that Islam transcended all other boundaries of personal and collective identity, and could serve as the basis of a pan-Islamic movement.

The Arab-Persian symbiosis of the Shi'i academies of Iraq laid the foundations for the emergence of Hizballah. Upon their return to Lebanon, young Shi'i scholars schooled in Najaf indoctrinated their followers with the same ideas they themselves had imbibed during their student days. For the most part, these clerics remained aloof from the Amal movement, which was then under the leadership of the Iranian-born Imam Musa al-Sadr. Sadr also had extensive connections with the world of Shi'i scholarship in Najaf, and gave his moral support to the idea of an Islamic state in Iran and Iraq. But as the pre-eminent leader of the Shi'i community in Lebanon, Sadr did not call for revolution in Lebanon, but demanded the reform of Lebanon's confessional system along more equitable lines.[9]

In contrast, many of the Najaf-schooled clerics were convinced of the moral obligation to champion the idea of an Islamic or pan-Islamic state,

even if its implementation in Lebanon seemed remote. They preached their doctrine to relatively small numbers of Shi'i followers, whose ranks were suddenly swollen by the triumph of the Islamic movement in Iran in 1979. That revolution fired the imaginations of the Najaf-schooled clerics, who saw their former classmates elevated to positions of the highest authority in a state devoted to the implementation of the ideals of their youth. When Iranian emissaries arrived in Lebanon following the Iranian revolution, their meetings with these Shi'i clerics were not first encounters; they were reunions.

It is all the more paradoxical that the first efforts to build bridges between Islamic Iran and Lebanon were not made through the agency of the Najaf-educated clerics. Several of Islamic Iran's leading lay figures had spent periods of exile in Lebanon in the ranks of Palestinian organizations. After Iran's revolution in 1979, some of them sought to enter the Lebanese arena through the agency of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which invited and anticipated Iranian assistance.[10] The idea of sending an Islamic expeditionary force to Lebanon at Palestinian invitation was the brainchild of Hojjat al-Islam Muhammad Montazeri, son of the Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri. The younger Montazeri, known for his unstable and volatile personality, had spent some time in Lebanon with Palestinian groups prior to the Iranian revolution. Following the revolution's success, he began to recruit volunteers for an expeditionary force of 1,000 Revolutionary Guards who would be sent to Lebanon, and whose ranks were eventually intended to be expanded to 10,000. The Lebanese government grew very apprehensive about the possible arrival of these volunteers, and even planned to close Beirut's airport should a flight of volunteers arrive. In the end, the younger Montazeri led a group of a few hundred Iranians to Damascus, in the hope that the Syrian government would permit their passage to Lebanon. But Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad deemed their presence an unwanted complication, and assured Lebanese President Elias Sarkis that the Iranian volunteers would not be permitted to cross into Lebanon. When Iraq invaded Iran a few months later, the Iranians departed for that other battlefront, which provided a seemingly inexhaustible outlet for the zeal of would-be martyrs.

The initiative of 1979 proved to be a false start. But although the volunteers failed to arrive (cf. chapter by Olmert), delegations of Iranian clerics became a frequent sight in the Shi'i-populated areas of Lebanon after 1979, and Lebanese Shi'is visited Iran in growing numbers. Iranian emissaries began to seek out Lebanese Shi'i partners who would translate and transmit Islamic Iran's message, and faithfully implement the program of the Imam Khomeini for the redemption of Islam from the grip of the "world-devourers." At first, Iran did not attempt to establish a separate framework for its supporters, but sought closer ties with existing organizations, such as the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council (SISC) and the Amal movement (which opened an office in Tehran). The Iranian embassy in Beirut also conducted its own activities in the Shi'i southern suburbs of the city, organizing meetings and demonstrations and subsidizing various Lebanese Shi'i publications.

The attempt to work solely through the established institutions of the Shi'i community did not succeed. These institutions were not malleable, and their leaders remained jealous of their independence. While they were prepared to make ritual obeisance to Khomeini, theirs were essentially Lebanese institutions, and they viewed the Shi'i predicament as a Lebanese problem which could only be resolved through the reform of the Lebanese state. In taking this stand, they essentially dismissed the Iranian doctrines of Islamic revolution, government, and unity as irrelevant to the complex confessional situation of Lebanon. The head of the SISC, Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, argued as late as 1983 that "the Shi'i Muslims in Lebanon have always been Lebanese first . . . every sect in Lebanon at some time in its history has resorted to calling for help from an outside foreign power—with the exception of the Shi'i Muslims, who have always been loyal and sincere to Lebanon. Lebanon is their native land. When dealing with matters concerning Lebanon, their premises are always purely Lebanese."[11] It was Iran's intention to undermine this claim by building a following loyal not to Lebanon but to Islam as defined and led by the Imam Khomeini.

To do so, Iranian emissaries had to identify and encourage Lebanese Shi'is who did not share a fundamental commitment to the Lebanese state. Iran eventually found them among the Najaf-educated clerics. In addition to their past clandestine membership in Islamic political groups operating against the Iraqi regime, some of them appeared openly as leaders of the Lebanese Muslim Students' Union. This organization, based in the Arab University of Beirut, brought together a number of Shi'i youths who shared a devotion to the idea of Islamic rule in Lebanon. The Lebanese Muslim Students' Union may properly be called the precursor of Hizballah. On the pages of its periodical, *al-Muntalaq*, there is much evidence for Iran's early efforts at building influence among those Lebanese Shi'i clerics and laymen who were already partisans of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Once Iran's clerics began to operate through Lebanon's Najaf-educated scholars, their effectiveness grew and their message gained resonance. Elsewhere in the Muslim world, Iran's spokesmen had to provide a double translation of Iran's revolutionary message. Not only did they have to translate from Persian to Arabic; they had to substitute a bland all-Islamic ecumenism for the evocative symbols of Shi'ism. But in Lebanon, Iran found a large Shi'i community which fully understood the nuanced symbolism of Iran's revolution and the particular emphasis on the seventh-century martyrdom of the Imam Husayn as a paradigm of political action.[12] Among the Najaf-schooled clerics, Iran found spokesmen adept at translating Khomeini's message into eloquent Arabic and arguing its relevance to the predicament of Lebanon.

In 1982, after Israel invaded Lebanon, Iran sought to demonstrate solidarity with the Palestinians, the Syrians, and Lebanon's Shi'is in the fight against Israeli occupation. This it again proposed to do by sending Iranian volunteers through Syria into Lebanon, where they would battle Israeli forces. The context of this proposal differed decisively from that of the failed initiative

of 1979. The collapse of all central authority in Lebanon meant that the Lebanese government's protests counted for naught in Damascus, and Syria was free to make its own calculation.[13] A small Iranian contingent thus reached the Biqa Valley and, beginning in October 1982, established itself there. They were joined by a group of Lebanese Shi'is who had abandoned the Amal movement during the summer to create their own Islamic Amal. A leading spokesman of Hizballah later claimed that the arrival of the Revolutionary Guards in 1982 was "the basic factor in changing the course of Lebanese and Middle Eastern history, for it dashed the American, Israeli, and Maronite plans."[14]

Almost immediately upon their arrival in the Biqa Valley, the Iranians began the systematic recruitment of Lebanese Shi'is to their flag. By a brilliant combination of ideological indoctrination and material inducement, the Iranians created a sizeable constituency among Lebanese Shi'is, and this following took the name of Hizballah, derived from the Qur'anic verse: "And verily the party of God is sure to triumph." As its logo, Hizballah chose a raised arm bearing an automatic rifle against the background of a globe; below the logo appeared the motto: "The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon." The movement rapidly gained momentum, and soon spread to the other major areas of Shi'i population, in the southern suburbs of Beirut and the villages and towns of southern Lebanon. Hizballah's message had great appeal for that part of the Shi'i community that had despaired of the Lebanese state. The Islamic movement, claimed Hizballah, would rid Lebanon of foreign intruders, end confessional strife, establish a regime of social justice, and set the stage for the liberation of Jerusalem. Within a year of its creation, Hizballah was a going concern, led by eloquent Lebanese Shi'is who commanded an armed militia and a highly effective clandestine branch.

The Symbolic World of Hizballah

Hizballah's style sets the scene for any analysis of the substance of its message. Judging simply from appearances, the untrained eye might have difficulty distinguishing between a demonstration by Hizballah in Beirut or the Biqa Valley, and a similar one in Tehran. Highly ritualized, from the order of procession to the burning of the American flag, they are essentially a re-enactment of Tehran street demonstrations. In matters of dress and personal appearance, the influence of Iranian example upon the rank and file in Hizballah is also obvious. But the imitation also extends to visual symbols. Hizballah does have its own symbol, which makes no explicit reference to Iran (although its artistic lines are clearly inspired by Iranian models). The accompanying symbols, however, are overwhelmingly Iranian.[15]

Thus, Khomeini's portrait dominates the symbolic world of Hizballah. Khomeini appears on the masthead of Hizballah's own weekly newspaper, *al-Ahd* (in the place occupied by a portrait of the Imam Musa al-Sadr in the newspaper of the rival Amal movement). Khomeini's portrait is prominently displayed at all events sponsored by Hizballah. And on the anniversary of Iran's revolution, little girls dressed in chadors distribute pictures of

Khomeini to passing motorists.[16] Often Khomeini's visage is accompanied by portraits of leading figures in Iranian martyrology such as Ayatollah Motahheri, as well as portraits of living leaders, such as Ayatollah Montazeri. There are also portraits of Lebanese Shi'i martyrs, especially Shaykh Raghib Harb,[17] and also of the missing Imam Musa al-Sadr. The indulgence in this kind of iconography, as well as its artistic style, is highly reminiscent of current Iranian models, and probably owes its origins to examples imported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Biqa Valley. The flag borne by Hizballah is the Iranian flag, regarded by its bearers as the "flag of Islam."[18]

The vocabulary of slogans is similarly borrowed from Islamic Iran, and so too are the rhetorical devices of many of Hizballah's spokesmen. Even before Hizballah had its own publications and radio station, Iranian materials in Arabic enjoyed a wide circulation in Lebanon. What resounded in Iran often resounded just as well in the Shi'i community of Lebanon. The name Hizballah, although itself taken from a verse in the Qur'an, is nonetheless a borrowing from the political vocabulary of post-revolutionary Iran, where it connotes the populist and sometimes violent vigilante groups that championed the "line of the Imam" against would-be compromisers. Similarly, Hizballah has adopted all of the principle catchwords of Iran's revolutionary rhetoric. The Muslims (and the other oppressed peoples of the world) are the "disinherited," the *mustad'afun* of the Qur'an; the United States and the Soviet Union represent "world arrogance," *al-istikbar al-alami,* which is one hostile bloc pitted against the *mustad'afun.* These themes are evident not only in Hizballah's official programmatic statement,[19] but in the daily exhortations of its clerics. And they are echoed at the lowest level of Hizballah's discourse: in the last wills and testaments of Hizballah's militiamen, which are published regularly in Hizballah's weekly newspaper and clearly owe their form and content to the tens of thousands of Iranian examples published during the Gulf war.[20] The movement demonstrates, dresses, speaks and writes almost exclusively in the revolutionary parameters set by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The richness of Hizballah's symbolic world is difficult to appreciate from the outside. An ostensibly simple symbol—a ring worn by Hizballahis, from leading clerics to airline hijackers—may be laden with symbolic meanings that are not immediately apparent. Often it speaks of a past visit to Iran; but does it imply more, representing membership or authority? What are the social and cultural implications of the use by Hizballahis in the Biqa Valley of Persian salutations? It is on this level of minutiae that many members of Hizballah experience personal transformation and mental escape from the confines of one sect in a small state of many sects. Identification with the vastness of Islamic revolution may find its most satisfying expression in dress or speech that identify the Hizballahi with an Islamic state, leader, cause, or cultural legacy much greater than his own, much as the Maronite in East Beirut adopts dress and speech that demonstrate affiliation with the West. While East Beirut vainly seeks to emulate Paris, the southern suburbs seek to recreate Tehran. Beirut cannot be either, yet momentary illusions are created day by day through the discriminating use of symbols.

The Duty to Obey

Once it has been determined that Islamic Iran established Hizballah, funds Hizballah, and provides Hizballah with everything from portraits of Khomeini to tried and tested slogans, it remains to be demonstrated that Hizballah sees itself primarily as an instrument of Islamic Iran. The Lebanese client is famous (or notorious) for his willingness to take everything but orders from his patron. It is for this reason that the insistence upon obedience and discipline has become Iran's principal preoccupation in its relationship with Hizballah.

The fullest programmatic statement issued by Hizballah is its "open letter" to the "disinherited of Lebanon and the world," dated 16 February 1985. By issuing a statement of aims in the form of an "open letter," Iran's closest collaborators in Hizballah hoped to enforce a modicum of ideological discipline and assure that Hizballah spoke with one voice. The "open letter" includes a straightforward declaration of allegiance to Iran and Khomeini:

> We are sons of the nation of Hizballah, whose vanguard God made victorious in Iran, and who re-established the nucleus of a central Islamic state in the world. We abide by the orders of the sole wise and just command of the supreme jurisconsult who meets the qualifications, and who is presently incarnate in the Imam and guide, the Great Ayatollah Khomeini, may his authority be perpetuated—enabler of the revolution of the Muslims and harbinger of their glorious renaissance.[21]

While the front cover of the letter carries a portrait of a "martyred" Lebanese Shi'i cleric, the back is illustrated with a portrait of Khomeini. This is Hizballah's fundamental pledge of obedience to Khomeini, who is named elsewhere in the open letter as "the leader" (*al-qa'id*), in imitation of the Persian designation of Khomeini as "leader" (*rahbar*) of the Islamic revolution.[22]

The political theory to which Hizballah subscribes is the principle of government by the just jurisconsult, *al-wali al-faqih*. This is the same theory made famous by the Imam Khomeini as the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* in his well-known tract on Islamic Government, and it is the theory enshrined in the 1979 constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its fundamental assumptions are Shi'i, in that it emphasizes the passage of authority to the just jurisconsult in the absence of the Twelfth Imam. According to the leading clerics in Hizballah, the authority of *al-wali al-faqih* knows no limits. As Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah explained, "the *faqih* is the guardian during the absence [of the Twelfth Imam], and the extent of his authority is wider than that of any other person. . . . We must obey *al-wali al-faqih;* disagreement with him is not permitted. The guardianship of the *faqih* is like the guardianship of the Prophet Muhammad and of the infallible Imam. . . . When *al-wali al-faqih* orders that someone be obeyed, such obedience is obligatory."[23]

For Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, the most important distinguishing feature of Hizballah is the tie between the people and the just jurisconsult (*al-faqih al-adil*); Hizballah carries out the decisions issued by the just jurisconsult. That jurisconsult need not be Lebanese, for it is the geography of Islam, and not of Lebanon, which defines the arena of Hizballah's activity. "We do not derive our political decision-making from anyone but the jurisconsult (*al-faqih*). The jurisconsult is not defined by geography but by Islamic law." And so no barriers separate the faithful in Lebanon from the faithful in Iran: "We in Lebanon do not consider ourselves as separate from the revolution in Iran, especially on the question of Jerusalem. We consider ourselves—and pray to God that we will become—part of the army which the Imam wishes to create in order to liberate Jerusalem. We obey his orders because we do not believe in geography but in change." "God willing," declares Ibrahim al-Amin, "we will live up to our allegiance (*mubaya'a*) to the Imam."[24] Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah ascribes to Khomeini the qualities of a true Imam: descended from the Prophet Muhammad, he embodies the link with the Imam Husayn and the Prophets; he is the fulfillment of a divine promise; he stands at the point where the past, the present, and the future of the nation (*umma*) of Islam meet; to hear him speak is to hear Islam itself.[25]

Given Hizballah's certainty that the Imam Khomeini is divinely guided, ideological discipline is largely self-enforced. Yet there are times when contradictions emerge between the duty to obey and other ideological principles, and Hizballah must sometimes be reminded of its duty to accept Khomeini's superior judgment. This does not occur often or openly, but when it does, a certain tension is introduced into Iran's relationship with Hizballah—a tension that plays upon doubts which remain at the very back of the minds in Hizballah.

One of these doubts is particularly potent, for it touches on Lebanese Shi'i faith in the Imam Musa al-Sadr, the man who may best be described as the community's patron saint. The prevalent opinion among the Shi'is of Lebanon is that Libya's Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi is responsible for the fate of Sadr, who disappeared in 1978 while on a trip to Libya. On this account, the Amal movement is deeply hostile to Libya, and it seems probable that many in Hizballah are also convinced of Libya's guilt in the Sadr affair. Yet Islamic Iran maintains a co-operative relationship with Libya, through which both have sought to break out of an isolation imposed by the United States. For the Amal movement, this has represented a serious point of disagreement with Iran. Amal's spiritual leader, the Ja'fari Mufti Shaykh Abd al-Amir Qabalan, once told Iran's chargé d'affaires in Beirut that "if the Imam Khomeini does not return the Imam Musa al-Sadr to us, his way is different from ours, and his God is different from our God."[26] For some in Hizballah as well, Iranian support for Libya has created a distressing conflict between their duty to the missing Imam Sadr and the living Imam Khomeini. This becomes a burning issue once a year, when both Amal and Hizballah mark the anniversary of Sadr's disappearance. On these occasions,

speakers at Amal's rallies, and especially at the great gathering in Tyre, usually condemn Libya and demand that Libya return Sadr to his flock, if indeed he is alive.

Some in Hizballah have resolved their dilemma by refusing to believe that Khomeini has sanctioned close political ties with Libya. Such ties, they believe, must have been established against his will. For Hizballah, this belief has serious implications, for it suggests that the guidance offered to Hizballah by Iran may not always have the sanction of the Imam Khomeini. Hizballah's Shaykh Hasan Tarad went to great lengths to dispel all such doubts, in a speech in a Beirut *husayniyya*. Iran's decision to establish strategic relations with Libya, he explained, was based on Libya's important role in the regional political balance. "The great Imam Khomeini is the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Republic is the Imam. A decision like this decision could only be the Imam Khomeini's, taken at his instruction and under his supervision." Khomeini was to the Imam Sadr as "a father to his son and a teacher to his disciple," and so Khomeini would leave no stone unturned in his quest to discover Sadr's fate. But Iran was isolated politically, economically, and militarily, and Khomeini had determined that there was no choice but to take a positive stand toward Libya (and Syria). His primary consideration was his "solicitude for Islam and the defense of the general interest." And Shaykh Tarad reminded his listeners that the Imam Khomeini, "the absolute leader of the Islamic nation," is "the absolute authority (*mujtahid mutlaq*) for legal rulings, who solves any problem. Just as he is an authority for legal rulings, so he is an authority in all affairs."[27]

In practical terms, this constituted an admonition that members of Hizballah desist from criticizing Libya, even while calling for the return of the Imam Sadr. And indeed, in Hizballah's own rallies marking the event, no mention is made of Libya. Sadr's disappearance is attributed only to "the division of Islamic ranks." On one such occasion, Shaykh Hasan Nasrallah squarely placed Sadr in a subordinate place to Khomeini in Hizballah's eschatology: "Sayyid Musa al-Sadr was a foretoken of the revolution; the Islamic revolution then achieved a great victory, and the sun of the Imam Khomeini rose in the East. We live in the warmth of that sun; and were it ever to be concealed from us, the Imam would lead us back to it."[28] It is rare that Hizballah needs to be reminded so forcefully of its duty to submit to the superior judgment of the Imam Khomeini. The need to do so in this instance reflected the depth of Lebanese Shi'i resentment over the disappearance of the Imam Sadr.

Indeed, so important is the sanction of the Imam Khomeini that it is sometimes inferred rather than known. Such was the case in the suicide bombing attacks against Hizballah's adversaries in Lebanon, and in the kidnapping of foreigners. Both of these methods became subjects of some discussion within Hizballah, because they involved complicated problems of Islamic law.[29] The Imam Khomeini did not issue any explicit ruling in favor of the suicide bombings, because Iran disavowed any involvement in them. Considerable outside speculation focused on the possible role of

Hizballah's own clerics in sanctioning the attacks. But Hizballah could not salute such operations if the Imam Khomeini was known to be indifferent to them. After the bombings ceased, Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin made this assurance:

> Those who blew up the [US] Marines headquarters and the Israeli military governor in Tyre did not martyr themselves in accord with a decision by a political party or movement. They martyred themselves because the Imam Khomeini permitted them to do so. They saw nothing before them but God, and they defeated Israel and America for God. It was the Imam of the Nation [Khomeini] who showed them this path and instilled this spirit in them.[30]

In the case of the foreign hostages, Iran again has been most cautious to disavow any direct involvement in their detention, and so Khomeini has issued no formal opinion on the legality of seizing innocents. Once again, however, it has been Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin who has claimed that these operations enjoy Khomeini's sanction. Amin pointed out that Khomeini's silence over the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran constituted tacit approval: "The Imam neither protested this action nor said it was wrong." Since Khomeini has remained silent about hostage-holding in Lebanon, this must also be read as tacit approval.[31] For Hizballah, reading the will of Khomeini sometimes poses problems (as it does in Iran itself); but no one doubts the absolute authority of that will, and every effort has been made to fathom its myriad expressions.

Another test of Hizballah's faith involved the arms-for-hostages dealings between Iran and the United States. Once again, certain persons in Hizballah could not believe that the secret contacts between the United States and Islamic Iran enjoyed the sanction of Khomeini. "The Islamic revolution asserts rejection of America and the refusal to deal with it," Husayn al-Musawi, the leader of Islamic Amal, said when asked about his attitude to Amal leader Nabih Birri. He said: "Nabih deals with the Americans."[32] Word that Islamic Iran itself had dealt with the Americans again raised the question of whether the actions of the Islamic Republic were in full accord with the will of the Imam Khomeini. Shaykh Isma'il Khaliq, Ayatollah Montazeri's representative in Beirut, did not think so, for it was he who reportedly informed a Lebanese news magazine of Robert McFarlane's secret mission to Tehran.[33]

In treating these revelations, Hizballah's own newspaper simply repeated the denials and rationalizations made by the leading Iranian figures in the episode. It carried the full text of the speech by Majlis Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who explained that the contacts had Khomeini's sanction.[34] The newspaper also reminded the rank and file in Hizballah of Iran's need for spare parts, and the importance of diplomatic as well as military victories for the triumph of the Islamic cause.[35] But all this seemed too ingenuous for the clerics of Hizballah. They were prepared to justify dealing with Libya, and no one had to remind them of the importance of seeking Syrian favor, however distasteful these two alliances might be. But none of them

was prepared to make the same argument in favor of dealing with the United States, the "root of all vice," and none of them did. Hizballah's clerics, by their total avoidance of the arms-for-hostages episode in their speeches and interviews, indicated their silent horror and the conviction that perhaps the Imam Khomeini did not know all that Iranian officials did in his name after all. They were obviously relieved that the initiative collapsed, and positively celebrated the political deterioration in the Gulf during the summer of 1987.[36]

The duty to obey is not always easy to bear, but is nonetheless bearable because of a conviction that the Imam Khomeini is divinely guided. The dependence of Hizballah on the charismatic authority of the Imam Khomeini is absolute, and the question of the Iranian succession has become a matter of the utmost interest in Hizballah. Montazeri was recognized by Hizballah as Khomeini's designated successor (*khalifa*), and gained an elevated standing in Hizballah because of the active role played in promoting Iranian involvement in Lebanon. When disagreements appeared in Hizballah, apparently over the issue of which Iranian persons and agencies represented the will of Khomeini, it was Ayatollah Montazeri who issued a decisive appeal for unity.[37] Fidelity to the Imam has had the same effect of deterring conflict in Hizballah as it has had in Iran. But members of Hizballah tended to align with their Iranian patrons over the devolution of Khomeini's authority and are likely to do so again now that he is dead. Should confusion develop as to the locus of spiritual and political authority in Iran, it is bound to be reflected in the ranks of Hizballah.

The Vision of Pan-Islam

If Khomeini's authority as the just jurisconsult knows no limits, then any frontier that artificially impedes the exercise of that authority is illegitimate. Hizballah therefore operates in Lebanon only as a branch of a larger Hizballah. That larger movement is composed of all downtrodden Muslims who struggle under the supreme guidance of Imam Khomeini against the injustices of imperialism and colonialism, throughout the world of Islam. According to Husayn al-Musawi, the aspirations of Hizballah in Lebanon are "an extension of the aspirations of adherents of Hizballah throughout the Islamic world." "Some say we are Muslim Lebanese," he observes. "No! We are Muslims of the world and we have close links with other Muslims of the world."[38] "We announce to the world," says a lesser cleric, "that the Islamic Republic is our mother, our religion, our Mecca, our blood, our arteries."[39] Hizballah's struggle, says an editorial in the movement's newspaper, "is an inseparable part of the overall Islamic strategy in the great and comprehensive confrontation with the aggression of Zionists, Crusaders, and world arrogance." Hizballah is simply a "forward position" of this struggle, which is being conducted simultaneously on many fronts.[40] "We are all brothers and fighting for the same cause," according to Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi. "Any attempt to separate us from our Iranian brothers or from Muslims in general is a crime."[41]

The corollary is that Iran as a state with its own interests does not exist for Hizballah. According to Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, "the strategy in which the Muslims of Lebanon are fighting with the revolution in Iran is not on behalf of the state of Iran; it is on behalf of Islam, which first burst forth in Iran."[42] That outbreak is of fundamentally eschatological significance for Hizballah; as Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah declares, "the divine state of justice realized on part of this earth will not remain confined within its geographic borders, and is the dawn which will lead to the appearance of the Mahdi, who will create the state of Islam on earth." Indeed, human history may be divided into two eras: that which preceded the Islamic revolution in Iran, and that which will follow it.[43] But the fact that this revolution began in Iran is of no significance, since it is destined to sweep across all of the artificial frontiers which divide Islam. Hizballah's clerics infrequently call the Islamic Republic of Iran by its official name, since this connotes the distinct existence of Iran as a state. In Hizballah's lexicon, the Islamic Republic of Iran is Iran of Islam, *Iran al-Islam*, which suggests that Iran is simply the province of that greater Islamic entity which even now is taking form.

The logical extension of this premise is that the principles of Arab or Persian nationalism, which divide the Muslim community along artificial lines, are utterly bankrupt. "We follow God and his religion of Islam, not Persia or the Arab nation," says Husayn al-Musawi. "If nationality and race obstruct Islamic links, then they are unacceptable."[44] Again, this is not the belief of a handful of ideologists, but has filtered down to the lower ranks of the movement, as in the remarks of a shaykh in a village mosque in South Lebanon, on the occasion of a visit by the chargé d'affaires of Iran's Beirut embassy (in 1986):

> There is no Arab brotherhood or nationalist brotherhood here, because the Arabs have given us no aid despite the continuation of the crisis here for ten years. . . . The most unifying link is Islam. . . . Is it not Islam which has brought brother [Mahmud] Nurani [the Iranian chargé d'affaires] to us? Where are the Arabs? Why does the Persian come, but not the Arab? This demonstrates that the true tie between one man and another is that of thought and belief. We have no solidarity or common denominator with any being who does not believe in God and His Prophet.[45]

Hizballah holds that the ties of Islamic belief are the only ties which truly bind, and they bind without distinction of origin, nationality, race, language, or sect. "The Arabs"—those who see themselves first and foremost as Arabs—are a subject of Hizballah's derision. "The Arabs for a long time have wanted peace with Israel," says Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli,[46] and a headline in Hizballah's newspaper proclaims the same.[47] Far from representing the vanguard of Islam, "the Arabs" are responsible for its corruption; until Iran's Islamic revolution, "the Islamic nation (*umma*) was a stiff corpse."[48]

All believing Muslims must work together to implement what Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin calls "the one Islamic world plan," the aim of which is the creation of a "great Islamic state" which will unite the entire region.[49]

This plan will proceed in four stages: confrontation with Israel; the toppling of the Lebanese regime; the liberation of Lebanon from any form of political or military intervention by the Great Powers; and the establishment of Islam as the basis of rule "until the Muslims of Lebanon join with the Muslims throughout the world in this age, to implement the single Islamic plan, and so become the centralized, single nation (*umma*) willed by God, who decreed that 'your nation will be one'."[50]

Hizballah therefore does not simply seek to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon: "We do not believe that it would be natural for an Islamic state to arise in Lebanon outside the plan," says Ibrahim al-Amin. "We wish Lebanon to be a part of the plan."[51] The establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon "is not our demand," says Husayn al-Musawi. The aim is rather to create an "all-encompassing Islamic state" which will include Lebanon.[52] "We do not work or think within the borders of Lebanon," declares Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, "this little geometric box, which is one of the legacies of imperialism."[53] According to Ibrahim al-Amin, Lebanon's agony will end only "when the final Middle East map is drawn. We seek almighty God's help in drawing this map as soon as possible, with the blood of the martyrs and the strength of those who wage the *jihad*."[54] This messianic notion that a "final" map of the entire region is now being drawn in blood sets the struggle of Hizballah in a larger pan-Islamic context for its adherents.

The strategy of an Islamic republic in Lebanon is therefore predicated upon Lebanon's inclusion in a larger Islamic state, which itself requires the success of Islamic revolution in adjacent lands. In this sense, Hizballah's strategy must be as grand as Lebanon is small. And until Iran's setbacks in the Gulf war and the cease-fire of 1988, Hizballah's spokesmen made victory in the Gulf war a prior condition for the realization of this vision. Husayn al-Musawi stated that "as long as the banners of Islam do not wave over Baghdad and an Islamic government is not established in that land, the establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon is not likely."[55] His statement reflected the widespread conviction in Hizballah that the movement could not achieve its aims independently: Lebanon was an isolated island surrounded by forces hostile to the idea of an Islamic republic. Even were an Islamic republic established there, it would not be viable so long as Hizballah was not contiguous with the larger movement's consolidated base in Iran. Hizballah's spokesmen therefore emphasized regional victory over victory in Lebanon. In thought and deed, Hizballah accorded priority to the war between Iran and Iraq—struggle between "Truth and Falsehood"—on the assumption that an Iranian victory in the Gulf war would set the stage for Hizballah's own inevitable triumph in Lebanon.

This is what Husayn al-Musawi meant when he declared that "no person, Lebanese or Iranian, believes that what happened in Tehran can also occur in Beirut," and concluded that "it is not proper now to present a plan for the formation of an Islamic republic."[56] That would be premature, said Abbas al-Musawi, because the overall "program of expansion" had been

"delayed" by the Gulf war.[57] Still, the ultimate triumph of Islam in this contest was not in doubt. Hizballah's newspaper offered exhaustive coverage of the innumerable Iranian offensives in the Gulf war, assuring readers that the victory of "the Islamic forces" was "only a matter of time."[58] For Hizballah, the Iranian claim that the Gulf war was the first step toward the liberation of Jerusalem was not a rhetorical one, but reflected the inevitable chronology of events according to the larger plan. Hizballah argued that until the successful conclusion of the Gulf war, Iran's Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon were under orders not to engage Israel directly. As Husayn al-Musawi explained, "they are far from their supply routes." But once victory was achieved in the Gulf, those routes would be shortened and the Revolutionary Guards would "be the vanguard of the holy struggle which will liberate Jerusalem. The road to Palestine will be open."[59] "Saddam will fall," declared Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin during Iran's drive against Basra early in 1987: "We must ready ourselves to become soldiers in the Army of Jerusalem."[60]

In the minds of those who elaborated this vision, there was nothing fantastic about this expectation. No one had believed that an Islamic state could be created against the will of the United States and the Soviet Union in Iran, yet it was done. No one had believed that a few dedicated Muslims could have driven the Americans, French, and Israelis from the heart of Lebanon, yet they did. Hizballah attributed these successes to the divinely-inspired and virtually infallible guidance of the Imam Khomeini.

Yet that same obligation to obey led Hizballah to endorse what had been unthinkable: a cease-fire with Iraq.[61] Khomeini's decision to accept United Nations Resolution 598 must have had a demoralizing effect upon Hizballah, which had viewed an Iranian victory as an essential condition for Hizballah's own success. An article in *al-Muntalaq*, explaining Khomeini's decision, put forward two basic arguments: one suggested that even though the cease-fire spelled the end of the war, martyrdom in the path of God had constituted a spiritual victory despite the military setbacks; the other suggested that the cease-fire was no more than an attempt to buy time and regroup, in accord with the precedents set by the Prophet Muhammad in the first wars of Islam.[62]

These arguments could do little to soften the blow, and Hizballah felt none of the relief sensed by many Iranians following Khomeini's cease-fire decision. So long as the war raged and Iran promised to incorporate Hizballah in a larger Islamic strategy, Hizballah's cause did not seem quite so fantastic. The cease-fire deflated the illusion and demonstrated Hizballah's far greater dependence on a pan-Islamic premise for its sense of purpose. Islamic Iran, as a sovereign state ruling over a large land mass and a population of some fifty million, might choose to abandon the dissemination of its revolutionary message and settle for Islam in one country. But the equivalent for Hizballah would be to settle for Islam in a few Beirut neighborhoods and outlying towns, surrounded on all sides by enemies. While the promotion of a "great Islamic state" might have always been a "hallucination" for the Iranians, it represented an absolute necessity for Hizballah.

And so despite the defeat in the Gulf war, Hizballah has not abandoned its pan-Islamic assumption that the movement cannot hope to succeed unless Islam triumphs in adjacent lands. Since the cease-fire, the Gulf war has been replaced in Hizballah's discourse by events in Palestine, described by its spokesmen as the "Islamic *intifada*." The rallies organized by Hizballah are now devoted to solidarity with the *intifada*, which is interpreted as a sign that the liberation of Jerusalem is not a distant dream after all.[63] Islam may have retreated in the Gulf, but it is advancing in Palestine itself, even under the Israeli occupation. The outbreak of the *intifada* and the prominent role of Islam in the Palestinian uprising (greatly exaggerated in Hizballah's presentation) has allowed the movement's thinkers to sustain their fundamental pan-Islamic vision despite the setback in the Gulf. Instead of reformulating their program in narrowly Lebanese terms, Hizballah's spokesmen are engaged in a process of reformulating a pan-Islamic strategy that discounts the Gulf and fixes upon Palestine.

This is all the more incongruous at a moment when Hizballah is investing the better part of its military energies in a battle against Amal. In most respects, this is a typically Lebanese struggle between militia groups over the control of turf. Yet Hizballah refuses to understand the conflict in narrowly Lebanese terms: it is conceived by Hizballah's spokesmen not as part of the struggle for Lebanon, but as a chapter in the struggle to liberate Jerusalem. Hizballah is committed to that liberation, Amal is not, and so Hizballah's struggle in Beirut's alleyways is really a battle for the redemption of Jerusalem. Hizballah continues to refuse to legitimate its struggle against Amal in Lebanese terms, as though Lebanon itself were not a prize worth the fight.

This pan-Islamic perspective, even on the street battles of Beirut, invests profound purpose in every act of Hizballah. By embracing the broadest perspective, Hizballahis fight their little wars not as resentful men and women from one aggrieved sect in a small state populated by many sects; they fight as Muslims of the world, the vanguard of a worldwide struggle, men and women who have transcended the narrow limits of confessional identity imposed upon them by the Lebanese state and the "world arrogance" of imperialism. Without a pan-Islamic premise, Hizballah would be reduced to the sorry dimensions of a Lebanese militia—not soldiers in the "Army of Jerusalem," but the wayward bandits of Islam.

A Lebanese Face of Hizballah

In this sea of subservience to Iran, there is an island of resistance represented by one influential Lebanese Shi'i cleric closely identified with Hizballah. The views of Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah constitute a balancing act between Hizballah's Iranian patrons and its Lebanese clients. He provides a counter-point to Hizballah's pan-Islamic premise, and so represents a source of unresolved tension in the movement.

Fadlallah owes his political ascent in Lebanon to his supposed influence over Hizballah. He is the most senior Shi'i cleric affiliated with Hizballah,

and is unquestionably the most articulate and subtle advocate of Islamic rule in Lebanon. Fadlallah was born in Najaf in 1935, but his father hailed from a village in southern Lebanon. In Najaf, Fadlallah studied under the leading theoreticians of Islamic government and economics, but he also felt the moderating influence of another teacher, the Imam Abu al-Qasem Kho'i, renowned for his apolitical devotion to scholarship. Fadlallah arrived in Beirut in 1966, and there began a promising career in preaching, teaching, writing, and communal work. He also became involved in the activities of the Lebanese Muslim Students' Union, and the idea of an Islamic state figured prominently in his preaching after Iran's revolution. Following the Israeli invasion in 1982, he turned his pulpit into a platform for criticism of foreign intervention in Lebanon and appeals for the implementation of Islamic law.[64]

Fadlallah is a man of no small ambition who claims a following not only in Hizballah but in Amal and even among Shi'is outside Lebanon. He aspires to be Lebanon's great persuader, a man of religion who stands above the mire of Lebanese militia politics, and to whom all will eventually turn for mediation. He does not wish to disqualify himself from a future role that might establish his authority far beyond the confines of Hizballah. Fadlallah therefore has no interest in being singled out as the leader, spiritual or otherwise, of Hizballah. He has repeatedly declared that were he the leader of Hizballah, he would "have enough courage to own up to that fact. It is simply not so." This allows him to affirm that "I am not responsible for the behavior of any armed or unarmed group."[65] Fadlallah avers that he has a following within Hizballah, but he rejects even the label of "spiritual guide" of the movement.[66]

Yet for all that, Fadlallah stands atop the informal hierarchy of clerics associated with Hizballah. He is senior to them all in his learning and status. They sometimes turn to him for guidance, and he is a regular fixture at Hizballah's rallies. Many who are devoted first and foremost to Fadlallah fill the ranks of Hizballah, and adherents of Hizballah fill his mosque in the Bi'r al-Abid quarter of Beirut. Hizballah uses his mosque for gatherings, and it may be Hizballah that guarantees Fadlallah's personal security against would-be assassins. Fadlallah's speeches and lectures figure prominently in Hizballah's newspaper, alongside the statements by clerics who openly identify with Hizballah. There are ties of mutual dependence among Hizballah's clerics, their Iranian guides, and Fadlallah, and a sense of shared purpose binds them. But for all that, Fadlallah has his own agenda, and it can never be assumed that his own positions represent any significant body of opinion within the movement. Fadlallah may well be excluded from the inner circles of consultation in Hizballah. Of his many independent stands, the most important for the purpose of comparison are his approaches to the authority of the Imam Khomeini, the significance for Lebanon of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the strategy of Islamic unity.

Fadlallah's attitude toward Khomeini is one of respect and admiration. "The Imam Khomeini represents an authority. He is a great and inspiring

Islamic leader, and, as such, we hold him in high esteem, and believe that he represents a mature and inspiring Islamic leadership."[67] Yet by this abstract and formalistic profession of admiration, Fadlallah dissents from the absolute allegiance offered by the clerics of Hizballah: Khomeini represents "an authority" but not the sole or absolute authority for Muslims everywhere. He is "inspiring" but not divinely-inspired. Once asked what most impressed him about Khomeini, Fadlallah did not cite the Imam's perfect judgement, but the fact that "he accepts no compromises with regard to himself or others."[68] While an admirable and perhaps even rare trait, this adherence to principle is not in itself a guarantee of infallibility. It is indeed rare for Fadlallah even to mention Khomeini unless specifically asked for an opinion by an interviewer. Unlike Hizballah's clerics, professions of allegiance to the Imam are not part of his repertoire.

More significantly, in the flood of words generated by Fadlallah there is no elaboration of the theory of rule by the just jurisconsult, the very bedrock of Hizballah's doctrine. This omission is not careless. Fadlallah remains to this day the general representative (*wakil amm*) of his former teacher, the elderly Imam Kho'i, who still resides in Najaf. In this capacity, Fadlallah continues to administer philanthropic institutions on Kho'i's behalf in Beirut. Prior to the Iranian revolution, the Imam Kho'i was widely regarded in Lebanon as the personal "source of authority" for most Lebanese Shi'is, and Fadlallah originally owed his standing and influence to his position as Kho'i's representative. Fadlallah must have sided with his teacher when Kho'i and Khomeini both taught in Najaf and Khomeini first began to theorize on the guardianship of the just jurisconsult. Kho'i claimed that no such guardianship existed, a stand which prompted Khomeini to deliver his famous series of lectures on Islamic government.[69] Fadlallah's present disinclination to proclaim the validity of Khomeini's theory is in harmony with his own intellectual origins and his continuing allegiance to his teacher.

Fadlallah admires but does not adore, and his attitude toward Islamic Iran has been one of respect mitigated by criticism. The regional significance of the Islamic revolution is not lost on him: he regards it as an "earthquake." But for Fadlallah, it is not an eschatological event above history, and it is subject to critical analysis. The Islamic revolution in Iran, despite the guidance of the Imam Khomeini, still represents no more than "an attempt to apply Islam. It makes mistakes, but it has the courage to admit its mistakes. It is trying to apply Islam to all aspects of life, but I do not think that it is 100 per cent successful yet because the changing of society requires time."[70] This view is doubtless held by others in Hizballah, but no one else dares pronounce it openly. Fadlallah is also bold in declaring his allegiance to his own conscience before all else. "I am not an agent for anybody's policy," Fadlallah once declared in response to a question concerning his relationship with Iran. "I am simply trying to implement my policy, which is based on Islam and which complements all the Islamic world's forces."[71] Fadlallah regards Iran as the "solid base" of the world Islamic movement, and he "adheres to Iran's line," but he asserts that "we are not agents of Iran, as

the media try to depict us. We do not owe allegiance to Iran in the full sense of the word." Fadlallah has gone so far as to claim that "we have the freedom to have our own views on special Lebanese affairs when speaking to Iranian brothers and others. We have our own views even in international issues, methods of political work, and lines of political thought."[72]

For Fadlallah, the implications of the Islamic revolution in Iran for Lebanon are not necessarily revolutionary, and Hizballah's official slogan of "Islamic revolution in Lebanon" is not his. In Iran, there was "a population composed of Muslims only, which accepts the line of Islam, and a regime that had become an obstacle in the way of Islamic rule. The only solution was to fight this regime." But such conditions do not obtain in Lebanon, and revolution may not be the solution there. "Sometimes there are obstacles that a revolution cannot eliminate."[73] It is Fadlallah's view that the rule of Islam in Lebanon will be achieved later rather than sooner, given the certain opposition of other religious communities in Lebanon and their powerful foreign supporters. That opposition cannot be reduced solely through intimidation and violence, but must be eroded gradually through a campaign of persuasion. Once that campaign has succeeded, Islam can be made to prevail through democratic means. Instead of arguing for the divine obligation of obedience to *al-wali al-faqih*, Fadlallah argues for rule by the majority.

And so it was Fadlallah who prevailed upon the drafters of Hizballah's "open letter" to include a passage declaring that Hizballah sought to "allow all of our people to decide their fate and choose the form of government they want with complete freedom."[74] For the drafters of the "open letter," the will of the majority was of no consequence when weighed against the will of the divinely-guided Imam. But Fadlallah made freedom to choose a matter of principle, and it is only this passage that gives the "open letter" the faint ring of a document of compromise. On the basis of this achievement, Fadlallah declared three months later that "Iranian decision-making officials" now "believe that the Lebanese problem should be solved through democracy or democracy of the majority because Lebanon can bear no more suffering."[75] In fact, Fadlallah's position created much resentment among certain Iranians and some of the clerics in Hizballah, valued his oratory but did not always sympathize with the mind behind the mouth. They tried to consign him for a time to a purgatory of their own making, by not inviting him to Iran and by according him only marginal coverage in Hizballah's media.[76] But these forms of pressure had no effect upon Fadlallah's standing, and were eventually abandoned.

Fadlallah's position regarding Lebanon has implications for his view of the regional situation, which Hizballah views strictly through the ideological prism of pan-Islam. Fadlallah also speaks of Islamic unity, but not in the categories employed by the clerics of Hizballah. He does not refer to the near or eventual establishment of a "great Islamic state," even when he affirms the essential unity of the nation (*umma*) of Islam.[77] Neither does he refer to the "overall Islamic strategy" within which Hizballah claims to

operate. The "export of the revolution" is understood by Fadlallah as a process limited by the power of the "exporting" state and the real circumstances of the "importing" countries. "We believe in exporting the revolution, but there is a difference between exporting the revolution as 'one unit' and exporting it as 'parts'. We believe that the nature of the actual circumstances necessitates its export as 'parts', since only this will bring us actual results."[78] The first of these "parts" is certainly not the establishment of a "great Islamic state."

For Fadlallah, the unity of Islam is not so much a process of political amalgamation as it is a process of sectarian reconciliation, especially between Shi'is and Sunnis. Because Fadlallah is aware of the tensions produced by this internal division in Islam, a tension which is acutely felt in Beirut and other parts of Lebanon, he has cleansed his rhetoric of nearly all Shi'i symbolism, with its heavy reliance upon the representative drama of Karbala. Often it is impossible to determine from the texts of these remarks that their author is a Shi'i. This is not the case for the other clerics in Hizballah or for the Hizballah-controlled media. Even while they proclaim the essential unity of Islam, they make as wide a use of Shi'i symbolism as Iran does, as though they expect not to be read or heard by Sunnis at all.

Fadlallah also understands the liberation of Jerusalem in an idiosyncratic manner. It has been argued that when Hizballah speaks of liberating Jerusalem, its hidden aim is to mobilize support for the seizure of power in Lebanon and the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. In this view, the "rhetorical insistence on liberation comes second in the order of priorities of the Islamic movement," and the liberation of South Lebanon "is considered second to an essential goal, the establishment of an Islamic state. In that, the Islamic groups are not different from any other of the groups of the Lebanese civil wars scene."[79] This assertion is demonstrably false for Hizballah as a whole, but precisely explains Fadlallah's own use of the theme of liberation. Fadlallah has asserted that Israel's elimination cannot be achieved in "one, two, or ten years," but that "we must persecute Israel for one hundred years if necessary."[80] One day, says Fadlallah, Jerusalem will be returned, but "in this connection we think of great periods of time."[81] When Fadlallah preaches Jerusalem's liberation, it is to mobilize a movement to liberate Lebanon for Islam.

And so Fadlallah represents an independent line. Were the young clerics of Hizballah—Ibrahim al-Amin, Subhi al-Tufayli, Hasan Nasrallah, Abbas al-Musawi, Hasan Tarad—capable of mobilizing sufficient support on their own, the movement's Iranian guides might have dispensed with Fadlallah's services and perhaps even conducted a campaign to discredit him. Instead, Hizballah courts Fadlallah. Fadlallah does inspire genuine confidence in some powerful Iranians, such as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. But the supporters of Montazeri and some of the younger clerics in Hizballah have suspected Fadlallah of insufficient zeal for Khomeini.

The Persistence of Pan-Islam

Throughout its modern history, pan-Islam has evoked both apprehension and skepticism in the West. "Pan-Islamism was a fashionable bogy in the same way and at the same time as the Yellow Peril was," writes Maxime Rodinson of the late nineteenth century. "Any anti-imperialistic demonstration, even when it sprang from purely local feelings, was attributed to pan-Islamism. The very word suggested an attempt at domination, an ideology of aggression, a conspiracy on a world-wide scale."[82] But after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, pan-Islam was dismissed as a species of bluff, deemed "ineffective" by Arnold Toynbee in a memorable passage in *A Study of History*.[83] The inability to penetrate the worlds in which pan-Islam has had some meaning—from the religious orders of the nineteenth century to Islamic Jihad in our own time—accentuates a tendency to over- or underestimate pan-Islam.

If the measure of pan-Islam's effect is its capacity to bedevil the West, then Iranian-inspired pan-Islam in the 1980s must be counted a triumph. But if the measure of pan-Islam's effect is its capacity to reconcile fundamental differences within Islam, then Iran's pan-Islam has clearly failed, as evidenced by sectarian interpretations of the Iran-Iraq war, the revival in the 1980s of vicious Sunni-Shi'i polemics, and the bloodshed during the pilgrimage of 1987.[84] Yet perhaps there are effects that are still hidden from view, working their way into the personal and collective identities of Muslims. On that level, it is not yet possible to know the consequences of Iran's pan-Islamic message.

Nevertheless, it is not too early to pronounce that Hizballah's growth in the 1980s has demonstrated that pan-Islam is not congenitally ineffective or anachronistic. Despite the apparent contradictions of the pan-Islamic premise, Iran and Hizballah have together inspired desperate men and women to act with pure zeal and purpose. The strong Iranian and Shi'i orientation of this pan-Islam has been its most serious limitation, and Hizballah remains the only mass movement outside Iran's frontiers to draw direct inspiration from the Imam Khomeini. But by its example, Hizballah has revived pan-Islam as a tenable set of assumptions about the real world. Pan-Islam worked for Iran in Lebanon because Lebanon was itself unworkable. Elsewhere in the Muslim world, similar kinds of unravelling may be underway. There are already signs that other Muslim movements, while rejecting the specifically Shi'i and Iranian content of Islamic Iran's message, are reintegrating a pan-Islamic premise in their expanding vision of the possible. This ultimately may prove to be the most far-reaching consequence of the heroic era in the short history of Hizballah.

Notes

Hizballah's weekly newspaper, *al-Ahd*, carries only the Islamic date. For the sake of precision, it has been cited here by issue number; the converted date appears in parentheses.

1. A growing secondary literature is devoted to Hizballah. The most extensive discussions are provided by Martin Kramer, "The Moral Logic of Hizballah," in Walter Reich (ed.), *The Psychology of Terrorism: Behaviors, World-Views, States of Mind* (Washington: The Wilson Center, forthcoming); French translation, "La morale du Hizbollah et sa logique," *Maghreb-Machrek* (Paris), no. 119 (January–February–March 1988), 39–59, with postscript by Jean Leca, 60–64; and Shimon Shapira, "The Origins of Hizballah," *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, 46 (Spring 1988), 115–30. For a brief description of the movement in the context of Lebanon's other Islamic movements, see Marius Deeb, *Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideology*, Occasional Papers Series of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University (Washington: November 1986), 12–19. Hizballah's relationship to Amal is briefly considered by Augustus Richard Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin: 1987), 99–106. Cf. journalistic accounts of Hizballah in books by Robin Wright, *Sacred Rage* (New York: 1985); and Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror* (London: 1987).

2. For a partial analysis of Islamic Iran's policy toward Lebanon, see R. K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East* (Baltimore: 1986), 175-95. The activities of Islamic Iran in Lebanon are also covered in the present author's essays in the *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, commencing with volume 8 (1983–84).

3. The fullest account of this assistance is the interview with the General Director of the Beirut office of the Martyrs' Foundation, *al-Ahd*, no. 135 (23 January 1987).

4. Speech by Shaykh Ali Yasin, *al-Ahd*, no. 88 (28 February 1986).

5. Nikki Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 41, no. 1 (March 1969), 27.

6. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: 1964), 270.

7. See James P. Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge: 1986), 114–15.

8. On the intellectual climate in this period in the Shi'i shrine cities, see Hanna Batatu, "Shi'i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da'wah al-Islamiyya and al-Mujahidin," in Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), *Shi'ism and Social Protest* (New Haven: 1986), 179–200; Pierre Martin, "Le clergé chiite en Irak hier et aujourd'hui," *Maghreb-Machrek* (Paris), no. 115 (January–February–March 1987), 41–51; Chibli Mallat, "Aux origines de la guerre Iran-Irak: l'axe Najaf-Téhéran," *Les Cahiers de l'Orient* (Paris), no. 3 (3d trimester, 1986), 119–36; idem, "Religious Militancy in Contemporary Iraq: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr and the Sunni-Shia Paradigm," *Third World Quarterly* (London), X/2 (April 1988), 683–98; and Amazia Baram's chapter in this volume.

9. For an assessment of Sadr and his legacy, see Fouad Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon* (Ithaca: 1986).

10. Early co-operation between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Khomeini is documented in the booklet *al-Imam al-Khomeini wal-qadiyya al-filastiniyya* (n.p., April 1979). This includes such texts as Yasir Arafat's letters to Khomeini, and Khomeini's statements in support of the Palestinian cause.

11. *Al-Mustaqbal*, 5 March 1983.

12. The sharing of these symbols is considered by Yves Gonzalez-Quijano, "Les interprétations d'un rite: célébrations de la 'Achoura au Liban," *Maghreb-Machrek*, no. 115 (January–February–March 1987), 5–28.

13. For Syria's considerations, see Olmert's chapter in this volume.

14. Speech by Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, *al-Ahd*, no. 133 (9 January 1987). Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, Hizballah's official spokesman, is the most prominent cleric openly identified with Hizballah in the Lebanese capital.

15. This comparative perspective relies in part upon William L. Hanaway, Jr., "The Symbolism of Persian Revolutionary Posters," in Barry M. Rosen (ed.), *Iran since the Revolution* (New York: 1985), pp. 31–50, 150–72; cf. the report on an Islamic art and portraiture exhibit in *al-Ahd*, no. 87 (2 February 1986).

16. Photograph in *al-Ahd*, no. 34 (15 February 1985).

17. Shaykh Raghib Harb was born in 1952 in the village of Jibshit in South Lebanon. He spent four years as a student in Najaf until deported by the Iraqi authorities, and returned to his village where he gained a following and a reputation for outspoken militancy. At the time of the Israeli invasion, he was in Iran, but he returned to South Lebanon and was detained by Israeli authorities in the spring of 1983. Protests prompted his release. Later that year he returned to Iran, but in February 1984 unidentified assassins shot him dead near his village. Hizballah claimed that his murder was the work of Israeli agents, and Shaykh Raghib Harb immediately became the central figure in Hizballah's expanding martyrology, known as *shaykh al-shuhada*, "shaykh of the martyrs." Hizballah observes the anniversary of his death through demonstrations and the paying of homage to his widow, and he is even commemorated by an Iranian postage stamp. See *al-Ahd*, no. 34 (15 February 1985), which includes recollections and many photographs; and no. 88 (28 February 1986), with biographical details and more photographs.

18. See the photographs of field units of the Hizballah-sponsored Islamic Resistance carrying Iranian flags, *al-Ahd*, nos. 131 (26 December 1986), 132 (2 January 1987), 133 (9 January 1987). For a photograph of the use of the Iranian flag to drape the coffin of a "martyred" fighter, see *al-Ahd*, no. 155 (12 June 1987).

19. See Hizballah's "open letter" to the "disinherited of Lebanon and the world," which constitutes the movement's manifesto. The letter first appeared as a pamphlet entitled *Nass al-risala al-maftuha allati wajjahaha Hizballah ila al-mustad'afin fi Lubnan wal-alam* (n.p. [Beirut], 26 Jumada II 1405/16 February 1985) (henceforth: *al-Risala al-maftuha*). An English translation appears in Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, 167–87.

20. The Iranian examples have been studied systematically by Werner Schmucker, "Iranische Märtyrertestamente," *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. 27, no. 4 (1987), 185–249.

21. *Al-Risala al-maftuha*, 6.

22. The well-known revolutionary slogan in Persian declares that "God is great, Khomeini is leader" (*Allahu akbar, Khomeini rahbar*); the Arabic equivalent proclaims that "God is one, Khomeini is leader" (*Allahu wahid, Khomeini qa'id*).

23. *Al-Ahd*, no. 148 (24 April 1987). This theory is fully elaborated in a seven-part series on the theory of Islamic rule by Hizballah's newspaper; see *al-Ahd*, nos. 124—130 (7, 14, 21, 28 November; 5, 12, 19 December 1986). Nasrallah is one of the most prominent clerics from South Lebanon in Hizballah.

24. *Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan* (Beirut: 1984), 150–51.

25. Speech by Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, *al-Ahd*, no. 85 (7 February 1986).

26. According to Sadiq al-Musawi, *Tehran Times*, 30 July 1981.

27. *Al-Ahd*, no. 63 (6 September 1985).

28. *Al-Ahd*, no. 115 (5 September 1986).

29. For the debate over both issues, see Kramer, "The Moral Logic of Hizballah."

30. *Al-Ahd*, no. 135 (23 January 1987). It would certainly seem that the families of those who achieved "martyrdom" in this fashion have been assured that their "martyrs" died with the sanction of Khomeini. In the home of the parents of the youth who destroyed the Israeli military facility in Tyre (Ahmad Qusayr), there hangs a plaque presented by an official representative of Iran, bearing an inscription, the face of Khomeini, and the symbol of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A photograph appears in *al-Ahd*, no. 125 (14 November 1986).

31. Speech by Ibrahim al-Amin, quoted by UPI, 30 June 1987.

32. *Al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali,* 28 October–3 November 1985. Musawi, a school teacher in his forties, is the only prominent spokesman of Hizballah who is not a cleric. His Islamic Amal is subsumed organizationally in Hizballah, although it apparently remains under his personal authority.

33. The involvement of Shaykh Isma'il Khaliq in bringing the news to the Beirut magazine *al-Shira* is discussed in *al-Dustur,* 22 December 1986.

34. *Al-Ahd,* no. 126 (21 November 1986).

35. Editorial in *al-Ahd,* no. 125 (14 November 1986).

36. See especially *al-Ahd,* nos. 161, 162 (24, 31 July 1987).

37. Text of appeal (and reproduction of the handwritten text with seal), *al-Ahd,* no. 123 (31 November 1986).

38. *Kayhan,* 27, 29 July 1986.

39. *Al-Ahd,* no. 146 (10 April 1987).

40. *Al-Ahd,* no. 89 (7 March 1986).

41. *Le Révue du Liban,,* 27 July–3 August 1985. Shaykh Abbas al-Musawi spent eight years in Najaf before coming to the Biqa Valley in 1978 in order to teach in a local academy which he helped to found.

42. *Al-Ahd,* no. 97 (2 May 1986).

43. *Al-Ahd,* no. 85 (7 February 1986).

44. *Al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali,* 10–16 June 1985.

45. *Al-Ahd,* no. 88 (28 February 1986).

46. *Al-Ahd,* no. 115 (5 September 1986). Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, Hizballah's most prominent cleric in the Biqa Valley, spent nine years studying in Najaf, and a brief time in Qom.

47. *Al-Ahd,* no. 153 (29 May 1987).

48. *Al-Ahd,* no. 115 (5 September 1986).

49. *Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan,* 148.

50. *Al-Ahd,* no. 128 (5 December 1986).

51. *Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan,* 148, 160-63.

52. *Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan,* 226-27.

53. *Al-Ahd,* no. 146 (10 April 1987).

54. *Kayhan,* 19 October 1985.

55. *Kayhan,* 27 July 1986.

56. *Kayhan,* 27 July 1986.

57. *La Révue du Liban,* 27 July–3 August 1985.

58. See especially the coverage of the drive on Basra, *al-Ahd,* no. 135 (23 January 1987).

59. *Al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali,* 10–16 June 1985.

60. *Al-Ahd,* no. 135 (23 January 1987).

61. Text of Hizballah statement on Iran's acceptance of United Nations Resolution 598, *al-Nahar,* 22 July 1988.

62. *Al-Muntalaq,* no. 46 (September 1988), pp. 58–70.

63. For accounts of such demonstrations, see *al-Ahd,* no. 195 (18 March 1988).

64. For a fuller biographical account, see Martin Kramer, "Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah," *Orient,* vol. 26, no. 2 (June 1985), 147–49. Some of Fadlallah's theoretical writings, mostly from the 1970s, have been examined in two articles by Olivier Carré: "Quelques mots-clefs de Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh," *Révue française de science politique,* vol. 37, no. 4 (August 1987), 478–501; and "La 'révolution islamique' selon Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh," *Orient,* vol. 29, no. 1 (March 1988), 68–84.

65. *Monday Morning,* 15–21 October 1984; *al-Nahar,* 3 October 1984.

66. *Al-Ittihad al-Usbu'i*, 30 January 1986.
67. *Monday Morning*, 15–21 October 1984.
68. *Der Spiegel*, 1 April 1985.
69. Gregory Rose, "*Velayat-e Faqih* and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," in Nikki R. Keddie (ed.), *Religion and Politics in Iran* (New Haven: 1983), 177.
70. *Monday Morning*, 15–21 October 1984.
71. *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 23 September 1986.
72. Radio Monte Carlo, 13 May 1988; quoted in DR, 20 May 1988.
73. *Middle East Insight*, June–July 1985.
74. *Al-Risala al-maftuha*, 15.
75. *Al-Hawadith*, 24 May 1985.
76. See for example the minimal coverage given to his remarks on the seventh anniversary of the revolution, *al-Ahd*, no. 85 (7 February 1986).
77. E.g. interview with Fadlallah on Iranian television; text in *al-Ahd*, no. 152 (22 May 1987).
78. *Al-Ahd*, no. 125 (14 November 1986).
79. Chibli Mallat, *Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon* (Oxford: 1988), 36–37.
80. *Monday Morning*, 14 September 1986.
81. *Der Spiegel*, 1 April 1985.
82. Maxime Rodinson, "The Western Image and Western Studies of Islam," in Joseph Schacht (ed.), *The Legacy of Islam* (2d ed.; Oxford: 1974), 53.
83. See Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Ineffectiveness of Pan-Islamism," in *A Study of History*, vol. 7 (London: 1954), 692–95.
84. See Martin Kramer, "Tragedy in Mecca," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), vol. 32, no. 2 (Spring 1988), 231–47.